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Abstract 
In May 2004 the New Zealand Government announced a number of welfare reforms (the Workingfor Families reforms) 
that will account for an increase in welfare expenditure of approximately $1.1 billion per-annum when fully 
implemented. Two objectives of these reforms are to reduce child poverty and to improve financial incentives for work 
at low wages. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of these reforms in achieving these objectives. Research is cited 
that shows that Working for Families should significantly reduce child poverty. This research, hm·vever. contains no 
estimates of the labour market behavioural effects of the reforms. This paper therefore estimates the likely labour 
market behavioural effects of the reforms and the impact of these effects on poverty reduction effectiveness and 
targeting efficiency. The improvement in financial incentives for work facing sole parents will be likely to improve the 
poverty reduction effectiveness of the reforms. The increase in disincentives.facing secondary earners will be likely to 
encourage partnered fam ilies to reduce their hours of work and market incomes. These responses will be likely to 
improve the targeting efficiency of the reforms but at a cost of increasing the excess burden of the we((are system. 
Introduction 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Working for 
Families (WFF) reforms in reducing child poverty and 
improving the financial incentives for work at low wages. 
This paper first summarises the key features of WFF. 
Issues in measuring poverty and the reduction in 
headcount rates of poverty fo llowing WFF are then 
considered. This is followed by an evaluation of issues in 
estimating financial incentives to supply labour and the 
changes in these financial incentives following WFF. 
The impact of these changes in financial incentives on 
poverty reduction effectiveness and targeting efficiency 
are then discussed. 
The Working for Families Reforms 
On 27 May 2004 the Minister of Social Development, the 
Hon. Steve Maharey, announced a number of welfare 
reforms targeting low-wage families with children. These 
reforms are forecast to account for an increase in 
government expenditure on the welfare system of 
approximately $1.1 billion per-annum when fully 
implemented by 1 April 2007. Key features of these 
reforms are: 
• October 2004: remove abatement of Accommodation 
Supplement during the $80 gross per-week earn ings' 
disregard for main benefit abatement; increase the 
thresholds at which non-beneficiary families' 
Accommodation Supplement begins to abate; and 
increase Childcare and OSCAR Subsidy rates. 
• April 2005: increase Family Support Rates ($25 per-
week for the eldest child and $15 per-week for 
additional children); remove chi ld component of 
main benefits; and mcrease Accommodation 
Supplement areas from three to four, with increases 
in the maximum rates of assistance in some areas. 
• October 2005: further increases in Chi Id care and 
OSCAR Subsidy rates. 
• April 2006: replace the $15 per-child Chi ld Tax 
Credit with an In-Work Payment of $60 per-week 
(with $15 per-child top-up for the fourth and 
additional ch ildren) avai lable to families not 
receiving a main benefit and working 30 hours per-
week if a couple or 20 hours per-week if single; 
remove abatement of Family Assistance on incomes 
between $20,356 and $27 ,500; and increase the 
Family Tax Credit, from providing a guaranteed 
minimum family income of $ 15,080 net to providing 
$ 17,000 net. 
• April 2007: increase Family Support rates by SI 0 
per-child per-week. 
The Family Assistance programmes arc also to be 
indexed to inflation, wi th the rates and thresholds 
increasing when Consumer Price Index increases reach a 
total of five percent. 
Estimating Poverty Reduction 
A central objective of WFF is to reduce child poverty. To 
help evaluate the success of these reforms in achieving 
this objective this section of the paper canvasses some of 
the vari ety of ways of conceptualising and techniques for 
measuring poverty . 
Poverty can be seen as a lack of adequate command over 
resources. Resources may include monetary income, 
non-monetary income (such as the imputed income from 
domestic labour and assets such as housing), 
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consumption, and endowments (including financial and 
human capital endowments). Unfortunately it is not 
poss ible to quantify many forms of income, consumption, 
and endowments. Further, even where resources can be 
quantified there may be difficulties in collecting and 
evaluating data. Consequently poverty measures often 
focus on a lack of monetary income. This use of an 
income measure contrasts with living standards measures 
(Stephens et a/, 200 I, p. 80]. Indeed, there are significant 
mismatches in the groups that income and living 
standards measures identify as experiencing inadequate 
outcomes (Perry, 2002, p. 101). 
A poverty threshold defines the level below which a 
monetary income is deemed inadequate. Different levels 
of inadequacy arc reflected in different income 
thresholds. The income threshold chosen can make a 
significant difference to measured poverty [Perry, 2004, 
p. 26]. Two income levels wide ly used in New Zealand 
and overseas arc the relati ve measures of 50% and 60% 
of cquivaliscd median household annual income [Perry, 
2004.p. 3 1). 
A relative (distributional) poverty threshold terms people 
poor if their incomes are judged inadequate in relation to 
those of other people in the society in which they belong. 
Relative poverty thresholds indicate the extent that people 
"arc. in effect, exc luded from ordinary li ving patterns, 
customs and acti vities" (Hagcnaars. in Stephcns, 1989, p. 
8]. An abso lute (nominal) poverty threshold terms people 
poor if their incomes arc below the level necessary to 
maintain a minimum standard of li ving that does not 
change over time (Stcphcns, 1989, p. 8].~ 
People deemed poor on the basis of their indi vidual 
incomes may reside in (and have access to the incomes 
ot) non-poor households. Measu red poverty thus reflects 
the income-sharing uni t used in defining the poverty 
threshold (e.g.. indi' iduals, families, or households) 
[Perry. 2004, p. 24). A household-based poverty 
thre:-.hold can account for the extent that people pool 
mcorncs and thus "function as an economic unit whose 
members have a common standard of li ving" [Jcnsen et 
ul, 200 I. p. 130). :~ Using a household-based threshold 
also. however. requires making assumptions regarding 
intra-household distribut ions of incomes [Apps et al. 
1999. p. 393: o· Dea. 2000. p. 13). 
As well as in their sharing of resources, households also 
uifTer in their relative income needs (their cost functions). 
Dif!Crcnt levels of monetary incomes are required to 
pro\'ide the same outcomes for households in different 
Circumstances. Variat ions in income needs can be 
accounted for by basing poverty thresholds on 
households' hypothetical cquiva liscd incomes 
(households' actua l incomes scaled to reflect their 
dif!Crcnt cost functions). Equivalence scales effectively 
re-rank the income distribution [van de Yen et al. 2003. p. 
:2]. 
The simples t povert y measures arc headcount measures. 
which state the number (or proportion) or households 
below the poverty threshold [Crcedy. 1998. p. 82]. 
However, these measures ignore " the actual incomes of 
the poor, other than the fact that they fall below the 
poverty line. Two societies may have the same 
headcount poverty measure, but the total cost of bringing 
all the poor up to the line may be very different in each 
society" [Creedy, 1998, pp. 82-83). 
A poverty measure reflecting the actual incomes of the 
poor is the poverty gap, which measures "the difference 
between income and the poverty line" [Creedy, 1998, p. 
83]. The poverty gap may be adjusted for the extent that 
households fall below the poverty threshold (poverty 
depth) [Stcphens et a/, 2001, p. 83). Two associated 
poverty measures are poverty reduction effectiveness (the 
ratio of benefi ts going to the pre-transfer poor to the total 
benefi ts needed by that group) and targeting efficiency 
(the extent that expenditure goes to the poor) [Stephens et 
a/, 200 I, p. 85]. These measures are discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Previous behavioural responses (such as changes in hours 
of work and household structures) to government 
ass istance will be reflected in poverty measures based on 
historical data. However, forecast poverty measures 
(based on estimated data) often do not consider future 
behavioural responses. Poverty measures also often do 
not consider the degree to which different people are in 
poverty at different times. A proportion of the poor may 
only be poor for a relatively short period due to income 
mobility in the population [O'Dea, 2000, p. 30). Yet the 
possible erosion in the abi lity to earn over time and the 
need to replace consumer durables mean that those people 
in long-term poverty may have greater needs [Creedy, 
1999, p. 411). 
Perry [2004] estimated the reduction in headcount 
poverty rates from WFF with a non-behavioural 
microsimulation model (TaxMod-A). TaxMod-A 
calculates income tax liabilities and welfare entitlement 
based upon characteristics of the population and rules 
regarding eligibility and abatement of income tax and 
welfare programmes [Prebble et a/ (eds.), 1992, pp. 29-
44). A population of fami lies is derived from 
demographic, income, and expenditure data contained in 
the Household Economic Survey (HES) [Gordon, 1997]. 
Survey data can provide information on the large number 
of people who do not currently participate in various 
welfare programmes but who may nevertheless be 
affected by a policy change to programmes' parameters 
(Atkinson, 1989, p. 194). Yet the sample of the 
population that this survey data is drawn from needs to be 
weighted up to estimate the entire New Zealand 
population. Thus in TaxMod-A each surveyed household 
is given a weighting representing the degree to which 
households of that type occur in the total population 
[Crecdy et al. 2003, p. 3). TaxMod-A also re-weights the 
H ES sample to allow for changing rates of unemployment 
and adjusts income data for inflation (wi th separate 
inflators for wage, self-employed, and interest income). 
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Working for Families and Headcount Poverty Rates 
Table I: Estimated impact of Working for Families on headcount poverty rates 
Threshold (1998 Base) 
Threshold in Equivalised Dollars 
Per-Annum (June 2005 dollars) 
Estimated Pre-Refonn Rate for 3 1 
March 2005 
After Phase 1 
After Full Implementation 
Reduction in Measured Poverty 
after Full Implementation 
(Proportional Decrease) 
Source: Perry, 2004, p. 35 
Chi ldren 
50% Household 
Median 
$10,750 
14.7% 
9.3% 
4.3% 
71.0% 
Perry's [2004, p. 35] estimates of the impact of WFF on 
headcount rates of poverty are shown in table one. These 
rates are both for children and the population as a whole 
and use poverty thresholds of 50% and 60% of the 
equivalised median household annual income. These 
estimates are based on the Revised Jensen Scale, which 
converts actual household incomes into hypothetical 
equivalised incomes reflecting household size and the 
ages and numbers of children [Perry, 2004, p. 25). These 
estimates assume no in changes labour market behaviour 
in response to WFF. 
WFF was estimated to lower the chi Id headcount poverty 
rate by around 70% using the 50% poverty threshold and 
by around 30% using the 60% poverty threshold. The 
reduction in total household headcount poverty was 
estimated as less than the reduction in child headcount 
poverty. WFF was estimated to lower the total household 
headcount poverty rate by around 40% using the 50% 
poverty threshold and by around 20% us ing the 60% 
poverty threshold [Perry, 2004, p. 35). Perry [2004] 
argues the greater reduction in the child headcount 
poverty rate reflects the child-focus of WFF, as families 
without children (a large proportion of all households in 
poverty) do not receive increased assistance from the 
modelled changes.4 
Although these estimates do not account for poverty 
depth (which would require attri buting greater weight to 
reductions in poverty fac ing households further below the 
poverty threshold) the increased poverty reduction at the 
50% threshold in comparison to the 60% threshold 
indicates that this reform package is targeted towards 
people further below the poverty threshold [Perry, 2004, 
p. 36). This result also partly reflects the equivalence 
scale used to model these changes. The Revised Jensen 
Whole Population 
60% Household 50% Household 60% Household 
Median Median Median 
$ 12,900 $ 10,750 $ 12,900 
29.0% 9.3% 17.8% 
24.2% 7.3% 15.8% 
20.5% 5.5% 13.9% 
29.0% 41.0% 22.0% 
Scale increases the cost functions of famil ies with 
multiple children (shifting them to lower levels in the 
hypothetical cqui vali sed income distribution). As the 
levels of assistance provided by WFF also increase as the 
numbers of children in the household increase then this 
targeting of assistance towards households fu rther below 
the equiva lised poverty threshold partl y reflects this 
downwards re-rank ing of famil ies with multiple children. 
Estimating Financial Incentives to Work 
A second central objective of WFF is to improve 
incentives for work at low wages. To help evaluate the 
success of these reforms in ac hieving this objecti ve this 
section of the paper canvasses some of the variety of 
ways of conceptua li sing and techniques for measuring 
financial incent ives to work. 
Welfare programmes may influence choices to supply 
labour on a number of margins. The extensive margin 
reflects dec isions on whether to work at all. The 
intensive margin reflects decisions on how many hours 
(or weeks) to work [Stroombergen, 2003, p. 6). The 
extensive margin reflects the change in the income 
available for consumption [Biundell, I 992, p. 20]. This 
change (the income effect) is reflected in the height of the 
budget constraint and can be illustrated with Average Tax 
Rates (A TRs). The intensive margin refl ects the change 
in the financial return from an additional hour in work 
(the net wage). This change (the substitution effect) is 
refl ected in the slope of the budget constraint and can be 
illustrated with Effec ti ve Marginal Tax Rates (EMTRs). 
A TRs show the ratio of taxes paid (and benefi ts received) 
to income [Creedy, 1999, p. 4 I I). EMTRs show the 
proportion by which a dollar increase in gross 
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income is reduced by income taxes and the abatement of 
welfare transfers. An EMTR is one minus the change in 
net income (after taxation and abatement of welfare 
transfers) resulting from earning an additional gross 
dollar [Nolan, 2003, p. 53; Prebble et a/ (eds.), 1992, pp. 
7-13]. 
Whether changes to A TRs and EMTRs reinforce or offset 
each other depends on the case at hand and requires 
empirical analysis [Biundell, 1992, p. 16; Heady, 1993, p. 
31]. For instance, removing abatement of the Family 
Assistance programmes from $20,356 until $27,500 (with 
no other policy changes) would: 
• Not affect households with mcomes below the 
change. 
• Create an income effect (reduced A TRs) 
discouraging work and a substitution effect (reduced 
EMTRs) encouraging work for households wi th 
incomes between $20.356 and $27,500. 
• Create an mcome 
discouraging work for 
above $20.356. 
effect (reduced A TRs) 
households with mcomes 
The size of the responses of different groups depends on 
the compensated elasti city of labour supply and the 
numbers of people in the groups [Heady, 1993, p. 35). 
However, households with the same gross wage may face 
d i ffercnt circumstances and have varying compensated 
elasticities of labour supply [BiundeiL 1992, p. 24]. 
Indeed, ew Zealand studies have shown that the labour 
supply of so le parents. part-time workers, secondary-
income earners, and teenage men tends to be more 
responsive to financial incen tives than that of primary 
earners and prime aged males [Brosnan et a/, 1989, p. 31; 
tvlaani, 19S9: Maloney, 1997: Prebblc et of (cds.) , 1992]. 
Est imating ATRs and EMTRs pose a number of 
challenges. A TRs and EMTRs reflect the (often 
complex) interaction of income tax and wet fa re 
programmes. Different programmes use different 
entitlement and aba tement schedules, eligibility criteria , 
Lletinitions of what counts as income. income uni ts 
(individual. family, and household), income periods 
(annual. fortnightly, or weekl y) , and implementation 
agencies (the Inland Revenue Department and the 
Min istry of Social Development). ATRs and EMTRs 
also differ among people with different charac teristics, 
depending on fac tors such as hours of work , wage rates 
receivell, marital status, numbers and ages of children, 
ava ilability of childcare, accommodation needs, and 
receipt of other assistance. 
Estimating A TRs and EMTRs of people in partncred 
families pose particular difficulties. In partncred 
households the labour supply decisions arc generally joint 
decis ions. In these households when either the primary or 
secondary ea rner changes his or her supply of labour the 
tota l household income changes. As social welfare 
benefits and Family Assistance programmes abate aga inst 
total household income the individual incentives facing 
primary and secondary earners arc influenced by the 
earntngs of their partners. However, due to the 
-
difficulty of modelling joint decisions, in this paper the 
changes in household income are modelled as individual 
decisions (where only one person makes a labour supply 
decision and the rest of the labour supply decisions in the 
household are held constant) [Prebble et a/ ( eds. ), 1992, 
pp. 37-38). 
When people are faced with a decision on whether or not 
to make relatively small changes in income (e.g., from 
working a few extra hours) EMTRs are likely to illustrate 
the financial incentives applying to their decisions. Yet 
when people are considering relatively large changes in 
income (e.g., whether to work part-time or full-time) or 
when they are constrained in the degree to which they can 
change their hours of work (e.g., when they have 
employment contracts contain ing fixed hours) EMTRs 
are less likely to illustrate the financial incentives 
applying to their decisions. Also, the hourly wage rate 
that a person can earn influences the number of hours of 
work for which they face particular A TRs or EMTRs. If, 
for example, a person 's hourly wage rate fe ll from $15 to 
$ 10 the numbers of hours of work over which they may 
face EMTRs created by the abatement of welfare 
programmes would increase. 
However, although important, there are limits to the 
usefu lness of A TRs and EMTRs. First, as well as these 
financial incehtives people's labour supply reflect the 
uncertainty that they feel about the level of their likely 
work or social security income, non-financial 
considerations for entering or remaining in the work force 
(including self-esteem and fear of damage to future 
employment prospects), and social security programmes' 
administrative incentives (such as work tests) [Barr, 1999, 
p. 13; Wilson, 1996, pp 13-15). Further, although people 
may appear to not face particular financial incentives 
(e.g., people located above or below the income levels at 
which incentives occur) they may still be affected by 
these incentives when making decisions (e.g. , by being 
discouraged from locating at income levels assoc iated 
with high disincentives to supply labour). 
Working for Families and EMTR Profiles 
The Treasury's estimates of the fiscal costs of WFF 
included estimates of the behavioural responses from the 
reforms. For the purposes of modelling fiscal costs 
conservati ve estimates of behavioural responses were 
used [Cullen et a/, 2004, p. 22). These behavioural 
estimates were prepared using the Melbourne Institute 
Tax and Transfer Simulator (see Creedy et a/ [2002] for a 
description of this model). The estimated behavioural 
responses from WFF were 2% of sole parents moving off 
a benefi t into work as a result of the reforms and no net 
change for couples. 
The effects of WFF on financial incentives to supply 
labour arc illustrated in figures one and two. Figure one 
is an EMTR profile of a sole parent earning $ 10 gross 
per-hour and with two children under 13. Figure two is 
an EMTR profi le of a secondary earner earning $ 15 gross 
per-hour and with two children under 13 and a work ing 
spouse. In figure two it is assumed that the primary 
ea rner works a fixed 40 hours per-week at $ 15 gross per-
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hour. These wage rates have been selected as they 
clolely approximate the median wages for these 
household types for 2003-04. In 2003-04 workers in the 
category of partnered people with working spouses and 
multiple children bad a median wage of $ 1 8.18. In 
contrast, single workers with children had a median wage 
of$12.67 [Nolan, 2004, p. 8]. 
Figures one and two compare the EMTRs profiles arising 
from the 2003-04 welfare system with those arising from 
the welfare system when WFF is fully implemented 
(excluding the Family Tax Credit). These profiles 
contain changes to the Accommodation Supplement, 
which would vary among households according to 
accommodation costs, areas of residency, and incomes. 
Thus it is assumed that the household has an unabated 
level of Accommodation Supplement of the maximum for 
pre-reform region two, which will become the post-
reform region three, of $100 increasing to $120. As well 
as the Family Tax Credit, the EMTR profiles do not 
include childcare assistance and indirect taxes. 
Although these profiles only illustrate EMTRs the impact 
of WFF on broader financial incentives to supply labour 
(including ATRs) is discussed below. 
Figure 1: Impact of Working for Families on the EMTR profile of a sole parent earning $10 per- hour and with 
two children (under 13 
Source: Author's estimates, based on the 2003-04 and proposed 2007-08 welfare systems (excluding the Family Tax 
Credit, childcare assistance, and indirect taxes) 
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Figure 2: Impact of Working for Families on the EMTR profile of a secondary earner in a partnered household 
earning $15 per-hour and with two children (under 13) 
Source: Author's estimates, based on the 2003-04 and proposed 2007-08 welfare systems (excluding the Family Tax 
Credit, childcare assistance, and indirect taxes) 
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For sole parent households, on non-benefit income up to 
$80 per-week the elimination of the abatement of the 
Accommodation Supplement while receiving a Domestic 
Purposes Benefit increases both the substitution effect 
encouraging work and the income effect discouraging 
work. If the substitution effect dominates the income 
effect then the overall result would be improved 
incentives for labour market participation of sole parent 
households currently not participating in the labour 
market. At between $80 and $360 non-benefit income 
per-week WFF creates an income effect di scouraging 
work effort . Depending on the strength of this income 
effec t some sole parent households in this band could be 
encouraged to reduce their hours of work (particularly as 
there remains little incentive for increases in hours of 
work between $ 180 and $360 non-benefi t income per-
week). However, the delay in the abatement of Family 
Assistance and the increased incentives for some 
households to ex it the main benefi t early (due to the 
lower level of the base benefit and the increased value of 
the In-Work Payment) mean that at between $360 and 
$530 non-benefit income per-week WFF reduces EMTRs 
fac ing so le parents and consequently improves the 
substitution effec t encouraging work at these incomes. 
Overall WFF improves incentives for sole parent 
households to enter the labour market and to leap into 
work that pays between S360 and S530 per-week. Sole 
parent households earning $1 80 to $360 non-benefit 
income per-week will continue to face high EMTRs (of 
92.2° o) due to abatement of the Domestic Purposes 
Bene fit. f"urthcr, sole parent households earning between 
$740 and S I ,200 per-\·Vcek (not shown in figure one) 
"ould face higher EMTRs and lower A TRs fol lowing 
WFF than before [Nolan, 2004, p. 17). Lowering levels 
t)f ::~ ba te mcnt along with increasing levels of assistance at 
lower incomes come at this economic cost of shifting 
tlisincent ivcs to supply labour further up the income 
distribut ion. However. given the relatively low median 
wage and relatively high proportion of part time work of 
sole p:nent households the dominant effect on so le 
parents is li kely to be an improvement in their financial 
incentives to work. 
ror p:lrtnered households, if it is assumed that primary 
ea rners' incomes arc a fixed $600 per-week, when 
secondmy income earners consider entering the labour 
market household incomes are already above the point at 
which the Unemployment Benefit is fully exhausted. 
Furth~.:r , at this level when secondary income earners 
enter the labour market they immediately face abatement 
nf Famil y Assistance and of the Accommodation 
Supplement as well as Personal Income Taxes and the 
/\CC Eamers' Levy. Consequently when secondary 
income earners consider earning up to $240 per-week 
they face no improvement in their substitution effect and 
fnce an income effect discouraging work. Depending on 
the strength of this income effect some secondary earners 
in th is band could be encouraged to reduce thei r hours of 
work or to no longer participate in the labour market. 
Due to the increased levels of Family Assistance and the 
Accommodation Supplement and delays in the 
abatement of these programmes, the EMTRs resulting 
from abatement of these programmes have been shifted 
higher into the distribution of household incomes. 
Consequently at between $240 and $600 of earnings per-
week secondary income earners face substitution and 
income effects discouraging increases in work. 
Given the above assumptions regarding primary earners' 
incomes, overall WFF does not improve incentives for 
secondary income earners to enter the labour market and 
increases the disincentives they face when they increase 
their earnings to between $240 and $600 per-week. 
(Reducing the primary earner's fixed income or the 
secondary earner's wage rate would postpone but extend 
this increase in disincentives.) The impact of the reforms 
on secondary earners was a particular concern of the 
Department of Labour [Cullen et a/, 2004, p. 24). Based 
on experiences with work-based income tax assistance in 
overseas jurisdictions, such as the Earned Income Tax 
Credi t in the United States, this increase in EMTRs will 
be likely to encourage secondary earners to drop out the 
labour market, rather than working or registering for 
unemployment assistance, and lead to some famil ies in 
this income range choosing to reduce their market 
incomes [Eissa et a/, 1999). WFF effectively subsidises 
some secondary earners to stay at home. 
Behavioural Responses, Poverty Reduction 
Effectiveness, and Targeting Efficiency 
The section above concluded that the likely effect of WFF 
on financial incentives to work would be to encourage the 
labour supply of sole parents and discourage the labour 
supply of secondary earners in partnered households. 
These behavioural responses from WFF would in turn 
affect the reduction in poverty reduction effectiveness, 
reduction in headcount poverty rates, and targeting 
efficiency of the reforms. 
The likely impact of the labour market behavioural 
responses from WFF on poverty reduction effectiveness, 
headcount poverty rates, and targeting efficiency are 
illustrated with hypothetical income distributions in 
figure three. The ordinate of the figure expresses 
equiva li scd household incomes and the abscissa expresses 
numbers of households. Illustrated in the figure are 
hypothetical post-transfer income distributions (both 
without (static) and with (behavioural ) labour supply 
effects) and a pre-transfer income distribution. The 
comparisons between the pre-transfer and post-transfer 
distributions are for the same calendar year. Yp is the 
poverty threshold. Y1-1 is a hypothetical point at which 
assistance from WFF is fully exhausted (creating a notch 
in the behavioural post-transfer line at this point. The 
lines remain apart due to the likely behavioural responses 
from other income tax and welfare programmes in 
operation) . 
Poverty reduction effecti veness is the ratio of benefits 
going to the prc-transfer poor to the total benefits needed 
by that group [Stephens et a/, 200 I, p. 85]. The total 
benefi ts needed by the poor are given by the area 
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bourded by the poverty threshold, the pre-transfer income 
dillribution, and the ordinate (the area abc in the figure). 
The benefits that go to the pre-transfer poor are given by 
the area bounded by the poverty threshold, the pre-
ll'lnlfer income distribution, the ordinate, and the post-
transfer income distribution (in the static case the area 
ebcd). Pre-transfer headcount poverty is given by the 
number of households at the point where the poverty 
threshold and the pre-transfer income distribution 
intersect (N0) . Post-transfer headcount poverty is given 
by the number of households at the point where the 
poverty threshold and the post-transfer income 
distribution intersect (in the static case N,). In order to 
simplify discussion this paper uses headcount poverty as 
a proxy for poverty reduction effectiveness. This 
assumption does not affect the conclusions of the paper. 
Targeting efficiency indicates the extent that expenditure 
goes to the poor (Stephens et a/, 200 I, p. 85]. Targeting 
effic iency is reduced by spillover. 
Figure 3: Hypothetical Pre-Transfer and Post-Transfer Income Distributions for 2007 
Change in Spillover to 
Pn!·1'ron&fer Non· Poor 
Post· Transfer 2007 
(Static) Post· Tro nsfor 2007 Equivali&ed 
Household 
Income 
Ch &nKe in Spillover t.o ---~C--1 
f>re.1'r8n.tfer Poor 
u b 
No 
Source: Based on Creedy, 1996, p. 103 
Spillover to the pre-transfer non-poor occurs when 
households with pre-transfer incomes above the poverty 
line receive some financial assistance. Spillover to the 
pre-transfer poor occurs when the transfers received by 
the pre-transfer poor are greater than those needed to lift 
their incomes to the poverty threshold [Creedy, 1996, pp. 
I 02, 1 04; Stephens et a/, 200 I, p. 85]. 
The reduction in the headcount rate of poverty without 
taking behavioural responses into account is a movement 
from N0 to N1. WFF is likely to encourage sole parent 
households to enter the labour market and increase their 
hours of work. Further, if sole parents are concentrated at 
lower levels of household incomes (reflecting their 
relatively low median wages and hours of work), even 
after these household incomes are equivalised, WFF 
would reduce the numbers of households at low incomes. 
This behavioural response would mean that the reduction 
in the headcount rate of poverty from WFF would be the 
larger shift from N0 to N2• Thus, given these assumptions, 
Perry's [2004, p. 35] estimates for poverty reduction 
following WFF may be understated. 
Targeting efficiency reflects the spillover of assistance to 
the poor and non-poor. WFF is likely to encourage 
secondary income earners to exit the labour market or 
reduce their hours of work. Further, if secondary income 
earners are concentrated in households at higher levels of 
(Behavioural) 
Prc·1'ransfer 2007 
Numbc•r of Households 
household incomes, even after these household incomes 
are equivalised, WFF would reduce the numbers of 
households at higher incomes. Spillover to the pre-
transfer poor both increases and decreases. For those pre-
transfer poor households who increase their labour supply 
spillover increases if thei r post-transfer static incomes are 
above the poverty threshold or if behavioural changes lift 
them from below to above the poverty threshold. For 
those pre-transfer poor households whose labour supply 
decreases spi Hover decreases. The overall change in 
spillover to the pre-transfer poor would thus depend on 
the size and responsiveness of labour supply of the 
different groups. Spillover to the pre-transfer non-poor 
unambiguously decreases when behavioural 
considerations are taken into account. 
The decrease in spillover to households who reduce their 
labour supply would come at an economic cost of 
increasing the excess burden associated with the welfare 
system. For instance, by "choosing to work less on 
average, workers will have lower incomes and thus will 
pay less taxes. Thus a change that would have been 
revenue-neutral for a fixed level of labour supply will, as 
a result of the reduction in work, produce a revenue loss. 
It is this revenue loss that represents the 'excess burden· 
of taxation" [Heady, 1993, p. 32]. The excess burden 
results from the higher taxes required to offset the 
reduced tax revenue from reductions in labour supply 
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[Creedy, 2003, p. 3; Heady, 1993, p. 32; S1emrod, 1993, 
p. 362). In evaluating WFF it is necessary to trade-off 
th is increase in excess burden against the gains to society 
from the reduction in poverty from these refonns. 
Evaluating this trade-off requi res value judgements to be 
made; the most notable of which is the evaluator's degree 
of aversion to poverty. 
Conclusions and Areas for Further Research 
This paper evaluated the effecti veness of WFF in 
reducing child poverty and improving the fi nancial 
incentives for work at low wages. This paper identified 
that WFF will be likely to reduce child poverty, 
encourage the labour supply of sole parents, and reduce 
the supply of secondary income earners. These labour 
supply behavioural responses will increase the poverty 
reduction effecti veness and targeting effic iency of the 
refom1s but at n cost of increasing the excess burden of 
the welfare system. 
The findings of this paper cou ld usefully be tested against 
more fonnal microsimulation modelling of the labour 
supply effects, poverty reduction effecti veness, and 
targeting effic iency of WFF. Modelling such as this 
cou ld soon be undertaken in New Zealand when the 
Treasury complete deve lopment of a behavioural 
component (TaxMod-B) to their existing microsimulation 
model. The findings of this paper also highlight the 
importance of further research on chang ing labour market 
participation. hours of work . and work and family- life 
balance [Bryant et a/, 2004: Singley et a/, 2004; Varuhas 
et ol. 2003]. The labour supply effects of WFF are most 
likely to be felt on the margin of participation in work and 
wi ll consequen tl y innuence people 's choices between 
being breadwinners or caregivers. 
~otes 
I. llclpful advice and comments on this paper were 
received from Associate Professor Bob Stephens and 
Dr. Paul Callistcr of the VUW School of 
Government. I am grateful for financial support for 
my research from the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young 
Leaders' Scholarship Committee and SPEaR 
Secretariat. All errors and omissions remain the 
1 
-· 
3. 
responsibi I ity of the author. 
Economic growth wi ll not lead to an increased 
measured incidence of poverty with a relative poverty 
th reshold. Unless an abso lute poverty threshold is 
adjusted for economic growth then over time an 
increas ing proportion of the population will fall 
below this threshold [Jcnscn et o/, 200 I, p. 133]. 
An indi vidual-based poverty measure can illustrate 
changes to the distribution of individual market 
earnings (an important component of household 
incomes). 
4 . Given limitations of Tax Mod-A and the HES data 
Perry l2004) does not model the Accommodation 
Supplement and childcarc changes. Sec Nolan [2003. 
pp. 35-37) for a discussion of the difficu lties 
associated wi th modelling these forms of assistance. 
lt is unclear if excluding this assistance would change 
the balance between the reduction in child and 
-
household headcount poverty, as while some of the 
increases in the Accommodation Supplement would 
go to families without children the reduction in child 
headcount poverty may also increase due to the 
increase in childcare assistance. 
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